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Symposium
The Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze
EXECUTIVE POWER: FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PERIPHERY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORE
MARK A. GRABER ∗
In 2006, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson announced that the United
States was transforming into a “National Surveillance State.” 1 This
“National Surveillance State,” they claim “is characterized by a significant
increase in government investments in technology and government
bureaucracies devoted to promoting domestic security” as well as
“gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the devices that the
digital revolution allows.” 2 While the al Qaeda attack of September 11,
2001 provided a crucial impetus for the development of this new regime,
Balkin and Levinson insisted that the roots lie deeper. The National
Surveillance State is a product of the way in which the communications
revolution has augmented the capacity of terrorist organizations and
ordinary criminals to commit heinous crimes while similarly augmenting
the capacity of government officials to use technology to prevent those
crimes and identify those criminals. As Balkin and Levinson note,
“[f]ocusing on war as the primary cause of the National Surveillance State
overlooks the fact that surveillance technologies that help the state track
Copyright © 2013 by Mark A. Graber.
∗
Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. Thanks to
the staff of the Maryland Law Review and all Schmooze participants.
1. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
2. Id. at 520–21.
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down terrorists can also be used to track and prevent domestic crime.” 3
Balkin and Levinson predicted that the National Surveillance State would
be bipartisan. They declared, “there may be no meaningful division
between the Democratic and Republican Parties with regard to the
imperatives for, and the broad outlines of, the National Surveillance State.”4
Recent events suggest their prescience. As Jack Goldsmith noted in a
recent book, the Obama Administration’s efforts in the War on Terror far
more resemble Bush Administration practices than candidate Obama’s
promises. “Contrary to nearly everyone’s expectations,” Goldsmith notes,
“the Obama Administration would continue almost all of its predecessor’s
policies, transforming what had seemed extraordinary under the Bush
regime into the ‘new normal’ of American counterterrorism policy.” 5
Guantanamo Bay remains open, electronic surveillance continues, and
Obama Administration officials, if anything, have increased the use of
unmanned drones for assassination attempts on suspected terrorist leaders.
Balkin and Levinson in 2006 maintained that “increased executive
power is one of the key elements of the emerging constitutional
revolution.” 6 They regarded “enhancement of presidential power” as “the
most important part of the Bush Administration’s constitutional agenda,” in
particular “the need for strong executive leadership in . . . the ‘War on
Terror.’” 7 They foresaw a nearly inevitable “shift [in] institutional power
and authority from Congress to the presidency” as a result of the National
One consequence of this transformation, they
Surveillance State. 8
conclude, is “the scope of presidential authority to combat terrorism has
become perhaps the central constitutional question of our era.” 9 The first
constitutional threat Balkin and Levinson warned Americans about was
distinctive to the present. “[T]he executive’s power to conduct war,” they
feared, “will displace the area previously assumed to fall within the criminal
justice system.” 10 Persons treated as enemy combatants, lawful or
unlawful, do not have the full range of rights as persons treated as
murderers or ordinary criminals. The other threat has deep roots in the
American constitutional past.
Just as the Framers thought the
distinguishing feature of “despotic government” was the “concentrat[ion]”
3. Id. at 522.
4. Id. at 528.
5. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, at 5 (2012). See Julie Novkov, The Dangerous Fantasy of Lincoln: Framing Executive
Power as Presidential Mastery, 73 MD. L. REV. 54, 64–65 (2013).
6. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 504.
7. Id. at 517–18.
8. Id. at 526.
9. Id. at 520.
10. Id. at 523.
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of “all the powers of government . . . in the same hands,” 11 so Balkin and
Levinson warn about “the inevitable dangers of concentrating too much
power in one branch of government without accountability and
transparency.” 12
Several important trends in American politics are also pushing
separation of powers issues from the constitutional periphery to the
constitutional core. The United States is presently experiencing the longest
period of divided government in the nation’s history. Since Richard Nixon
was elected in 1968, Democrats have controlled all three branches of
government for eight years and Republicans for only four. Each party has
controlled at least one branch of the national government during the other
thirty-two years. 13 Unsurprisingly, much separation of powers law dates
from the struggles Nixon had with Democrats in Congress over presidential
war powers, 14 executive privilege,15 and presidential authority to implement
(or not) federal statutes. 16 Every two-term president since Nixon has
experienced one or more major separation of powers crises.17 The parties
have become more polarized on more issues than at any other time in
American history. 18 Conservative Democrats and Liberal Republicans have
disappeared. 19 Polarized politics combined with divided government is a
recipe for intense separation of powers conflicts, as partisans and interest
groups struggle to empower the branch of government they control while
enfeebling rival institutions.
The centrality of constitutional concerns over executive power
distinguishes the National Surveillance State and the contemporary era from
almost any other constitutional regime experienced by the United States.
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 311 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
12. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 527.
13. David Mayhew notes “encountering undergraduates and even young graduate students
who seemed to view unified party control as a rare event on the order of an eclipse of the moon.”
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at x (2nd ed. 2005).
14. See 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 547–53 (2012).
15. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
16. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
17. Consider the Iran-Contra Affair during the Reagan presidency, the Clinton impeachment,
the controversy over Bush Administration policies during the War on Terror, and Obama
Administration policies on both the War on Terror and the Defense of Marriage Act.
18. See Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI.
35, 44 (2000) (noting a marked polarization of the national parties at the elite level); Geoffrey C.
Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and “Conflict Extension” in the American
Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 786, 799 (2002) (discussing the increasing polarization of parties
on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues).
19. See NICOL C. RAE, SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (1994); NICOL C. RAE, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS: FROM 1952 TO THE PRESENT (1989).
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Robert McCloskey in his classic, The American Supreme Court, 20 identified
three constitutional eras before 1960. The first was concerned with the
relationship between the federal government and the states. The second
was concerned with the regulation of business enterprise. The third was
concerned with civil rights and liberties.21 Executive power and separation
of powers issues played relatively minor roles in each of these regimes.
Howard Gillman, Mark Graber and Keith Whittington’s American
Constitutionalism22 pays more attention to issues of executive power in
American history, devoting a section in each chapter to such issues.
Nevertheless, the very chapter titles evince the relatively low salience of
separation of powers controversies until recently. Most chapters covering
the first 175 years of constitutional practice in the United States are named
for the dominant partisan coalition of the time or their central program, for
example, the Jacksonian Era, the Republican Era, and the New Deal/Great
Society Era. 23 These categories highlight how the driving forces of
American constitutional change in the nineteenth century and first twothirds of the twentieth century were visions that united most governing
officials. Before 1968, national separation of powers issues tended either to
be such isolated episodes as whether President Truman could seize the steel
mines 24 or such struggles between coalitional partners as were the debates
over habeas corpus and martial law during the Civil War.25
The 2013 University of Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze
sought to explore this new constitutional universe in which executive power
is arguably the most central constitutional issue challenging the political
regime. 26 Participants from the legal academy, the social sciences, and the
humanities considered a wide range of topics. Contributions explored
presidential authority from Abraham Lincoln to Barack Obama.
Conversations ranged from presidential management of the War on Terror
to executive interventions in the cultural wars.

20. ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson, ed., 4th ed.,
rev. 2005).
21. Id. at 15, 121–22.
22. See AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 14.
23. See id. at v–x.
24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
25. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). See
generally, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at
295–316. My sense is that outside of these materials, few constitutional law casebooks give any
attention to separation of powers cases or issues that were debated before Richard Nixon took
office.
26. For a brief outline of the nature of a schmooze, see Mark A. Graber, Foreword: From the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political Construction of Judicial Power,
65 MD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
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Two problems emerged as central to both the Schmooze conversations
and executive power in the modern state. The first concern is the extent to
which presidential discretion ought to be more cabined or increasingly
unleashed in the modern state. Carl Schmitt and his contemporary
followers insist that extensive executive prerogative powers are the sine qua
non of the modern state, a permanent feature of constitutional politics. 27
Presidents are at most checked by politics, and we are told law no longer
plays a role in alleged separation of powers systems. 28 Other commentators
insist that finding legal constraints on executive power remains as vital
today as in 1787 29 or that increased interbranch deliberation is essential to
ensuring fundamental constitutional ends.30 The second concern is the
status of rights in a world where the Executive plays a much greater role
than other institutions in determining who is at liberty to do what. Much
inherited wisdom proclaims that courts are vital means for preventing
ambitious executives from violating fundamental liberties.31 The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 32 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 33 are
Exhibits A and B for this position. Nevertheless, as both the Emancipation
Proclamation 34 and the Obama Administration’s refusal to defend the
Defense of Marriage Act in court 35 demonstrate, the executive branch may
be an effective bully pulpit for certain rights causes.
Kimberley L. Fletcher provides some historical background for the
increased presidential discretion exhibited by both the Bush and Obama

27. See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer, ed. & trans., Duke
University Press, 2008) (1928).
28. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).
29. See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON
TERROR (2009); PETER N. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).
30. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013); MARIAH
ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (2013).
31. The canonical citations here are Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)
(“[C]ourts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise
suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims
of prejudice and public excitement.”) and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”).
32. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
33. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
34. Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28–30 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953).
35. Eric Holder, Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the
Defense of Marriage Act (February 23, 2011), in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
14, at 945.
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Administrations in foreign affairs. In her view, the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation 36 provided
crucial foundations for contemporary views that presidents have enhanced
freedom of action abroad. The federal judiciary before 1936, she claims,
strictly policed executive discretion, limiting presidential war powers, for
example, to opposing sudden invasions and fighting wars declared by
Congress. 37 Fletcher maintains that Justice George Sutherland’s opinion in
Curtiss-Wright, by taking a quote from Congressmen John Marshall out of
context, put executive power on a new, far more dangerous path. When
Marshall in 1800 declared that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations,” 38 he meant that presidents were responsible for “announcing, not
formulating—American foreign policy.” 39 In the hands of Sutherland,
future Justices, and contemporary members of the State Department,
Marshall’s quote was reinterpreted as giving the President near exclusive
power to make foreign policy. As Fletcher details, Sutherland’s opinion
among attorneys from the executive branch quickly became the “‘CurtissWright, so I’m right’ cite” whenever the need arose to sanction presidential
discretion to use military force or intervene in a foreign crises.40 Truman
was the first President who assumed increased executive war powers to
fight “long wars,” 41 but Fletcher reminds us of the crucial role a unanimous
Court played in Curtiss-Wright, giving judicial blessing to “the growth of
the President’s unilateral powers and institutionaliz[ing] this prerogative in
the area of foreign affairs.” 42
Clement Fatovic makes the important point that the difference between
executive powers cabined by law and the extralegal prerogative powers
Fletcher and others fear may be less than meets the theoretical eye. Fatovic
observes that “executive power and prerogative” lie “along a continuum
that stretches from the least rule-bound to the most rule-bound exercises of
power.” 43 Just as “legal rules structure and regulate exercises of even the
most extraordinary forms of prerogative,” so “there is an unavoidable
element of discretion irreducible to law in even the most ordinary exercises

36. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
37. Kimberley L. Fletcher, The Court’s Decisive Hand Shapes The Executive’s Foreign
Affairs Policymaking Power, 73 Md. L. Rev. 247 (2013).
38. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
39. See Fletcher, supra note 37, at 260.
40. Id. at 285 (citation omitted).
41. See GRIFFIN, supra note 30, at 52–98.
42. Fletcher, supra note 37, at 286.
43. Clement Fatovic, Blurring the Lines: The Continuities Between Executive Power and
Prerogative, 73 MD. L. REV. 15, 16 (2013).
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of executive power.” 44 Presidents must inevitably make policy when
implementing federal law. “[T]he very act of following a rule,” Fatovic
notes, “involves an act of interpretation that is always to some degree
discretionary.” 45 More often than not, presidential prerogative powers have
roots in congressional mandates. Fatovic details how “much of the
tremendous growth in executive power has been the result of statutory
delegations.” 46 The Framers are notoriously unhelpful when Americans in
the twenty-first century make efforts to distinguish when prerogative power
goes too far, since James Madison and associates did not provide clear
boundaries for executive prerogative. 47 As a result, Fatovic concludes
“there may be an element of prerogative in all executive power.” 48
These ambiguities provide numerous openings for presidents to refrain
from implementing laws passed by Congress. Corinna Barrett Lain notes
that executives have at least three “passive-aggressive” options other than
refusing to implement a law (while hoping no one complains) and
implementing the law under protest.49 Executives can implement laws in
ways that undermine the purpose of the law. Montana responded to a
federal law mandating a 55-miles per hour limit on state highways by fining
speeders five dollars while making clear to police officers that the revenue
from the fines was far less than the enforcement and processing costs. 50
The congressional demand that Montana legally limit speeding was
complied with, but no speeding was actually deterred. 51 Given the
inevitable scarcity of resources, executives can declare that they lack the
finances necessary to implement the law. The Obama Administration has
informed federal attorneys that in light of “limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources,” they should not bother marijuana users who are
complying with local laws.52 Changes in professional practices may enable
executives to claim they lack the expertise to implement the law. The
Carter Administration refused to implement federal judicial decisions
declaring that gay and lesbian aliens not be admitted to the United States as
“psychopathic personalities” 53 after psychiatrists abandoned previous
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 37–44. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 244–87 (1996).
48. Fatovic, supra note 43, at 53.
49. Corinna Barrett Lain, Passive-Aggressive Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 227, 227–28
(2013).
50. Id. at 232–35.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 237–39 (citation omitted).
53. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967).
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beliefs that homosexuality was a disorder.54 These alternatives, Lain states,
have severe democratic problems. They “shirk[] executive branch duties,”
and send “inconsistent signals about where, when, and how laws will be
enforced.” 55
Kathleen Tipler is more enthusiastic about the democratic virtues of
presidential power not to enforce laws. Following a Jacksonian model of
the presidency, which emphasizes that the President holds the only office
“elected by the nation,” 56 she sees the President as having distinctive
representative duties. She writes, “both the electoral character of the
executive office as outlined in Article II, as well as the Take Care Clause,
generate a constitutional duty of democratic representation.” 57 As such, the
President may have special obligations to lead as a constitutional interpreter
and to support the powerless. Both obligations, in Tipler’s view, justify the
apparent paradoxical willingness of President Obama to implement the
Defense of Marriage Act, but not defend that measure in court. In her view,
putting aside some complex standing issues, “the Obama Administration
engaged in a constitutionally adequate balancing of conflicting
constitutional duties including conflicting duties of representation.”58 In
particular, Tipler maintains that the decision not to defend DOMA in court
was consistent with Obama’s previous “campaign promise to work for
LGBT rights,” 59 and consistent with an executive obligation to give “special
protection [to] historically disempowered minorities,” 60 while possibly
creating “conditions more conducive to dialogue and persuasion.”61
Peter E. Quint worries about the personnel who will implement
presidential decisions not to enforce or, more often, enforce federal law in
light of presidential policies.62 He maintains a clear distinction exists
between the role of the Senate in confirming federal Justices and the Senate
role in confirming executive branch officials. The Senate ought to review
the credentials of federal Justices carefully, in his view, because Justices
have independent authority to interpret the law. Quint writes, “[t]he
54. Lain, supra note 49, at 240–41.
55. Id. at 246.
56. Kathleen Tipler, Obama Administration’s Non-Defense of DOMA and the Executive Duty
to Represent, 73 MD. L. REV. 287, 300 (2013). See Andrew Jackson, Paper on the Removal of the
Deposits, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at
235.
57. Tipler, supra note 56, at 290.
58. Id. at 306.
59. Id. at 307–08.
60. Id. at 308.
61. Id. at 311.
62. Peter E. Quint, Implications of the President’s Appointment Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 85
(2013).
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President and the Senate are collaborating in the choice of a member of the
third branch. . . . [I]t is an independent branch not within the actual purview
of either of the departments that are collaborating in the choice.” 63 Far less
Senate scrutiny is justified when the President recommends an executive
branch appointment. These persons are responsible for carrying out
executive branch policy. Thus, Quint thinks the Supreme Court, when
considering questions about the presidential appointment and removal
powers, as the Justices will be doing in 2014 when resolving Noel Canning
v. NLRB, 64 should interpret the Constitution “to give significant weight to
the President’s authority to appoint those executive officers who, in the
President’s opinion, are most fit for the purpose of exercising discretion
under Article II . . . .” 65
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. invokes Abraham Lincoln when justifying
broad presidential power under the Take Care Clause of Article II, which
declares that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” 66 Chambers is particularly interested in the constitutionality of
the Emancipation Proclamation, which he claims might be better justified
by the President’s “Take Care” power than, as was actually the case, the
presidential power as Commander in Chief. 67 Lincoln was on strong
constitutional grounds when freeing slaves owned by disloyal masters.
Doing so merely implemented the First and Second Confiscation Acts. 68
More controversially, Chambers points out that the Emancipation
Proclamation might be understood as implementing the more general antislavery animus underlying various congressional programs enacted by the
Thirty-Seventh Congress. “[W]hen taken as a whole,” he declares, “Civil
War legislation passed before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued
makes clear that Congress was willing to move toward emancipation as a
war measure.” 69 Lincoln, when deciding to free slaves of both disloyal and
loyal citizens in places under Confederate control, in this view, was
faithfully executing the vision animating congressional measures, what

63. Id. at 86–87.
64. 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
65. Quint, supra note 62, at 97.
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
67. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, the Emancipation Proclamation, and Executive Power,
73 MD. L. REV. 100, 101–02 (2013). Chambers notes that the preliminary drafts of the
Emancipation Proclamation placed greater emphasis on previous legislation than the final version
Lincoln issued. Id. at 115–16. Compare Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation—First
Draft, in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 34, at 336–37, with
Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, supra note 34, at 28–30.
68. Chambers, supra note 67, at 125–27.
69. Id. at 103–04.

10

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:1

Chambers calls “the general arc of legislation,” 70 even if Lincoln’s precise
actions were not explicitly warranted by any federal statute.
Julie Novkov is more interested in debunking, or at least interrogating,
what might be called the “Lincoln would, so it must be good” citation
practice. 71 She begins by noting how both President George W. Bush and
President Barack Obama have sought public approval for unilateral
exercises of presidential power by appealing to Lincoln’s example. Both
Presidents, Novkov observes, have “courted comparisons to Lincoln and
invoked him.” 72 Bush cited Lincoln in justifying his policies in the War on
Terror. 73 Obama does so when presenting himself as a racial moderate and
calling for bipartisanship. 74 The result is to sanctify everything Lincoln did,
much of which might be questionable. Novkov is particularly disturbed by
how the movie Lincoln invokes Lincoln hagiography for subtle right-wing
purposes. By presenting the Thirteenth Amendment as devoted almost
exclusively to the abolition of human bondage, a claim that is almost
certainly wrong historically, 75 and formal legal equality only, the producers
are privileging an anti-classification interpretation of the post-Civil War
amendments as opposed to a more progressive anti-subordination
interpretation that might provide greater justification for affirmative action
and other measures that will help persons of color. In doing so, Novkov
fears, Lincoln “reinforces a particular strand of conservative racial ideology
that understands the civil rights movement and legal reforms of the
twentieth century to have achieved the promise of racial equality, leaving
the responsibility for remaining inequalities squarely on the shoulders of
those experiencing them.” 76
Leslie F. Goldstein is somewhat more optimistic about executive
capacity to protect rights. 77 Her comparative study of how different
institutions responded to claims made by various minorities during the late
nineteenth century finds that the national executive was somewhat more
progressive than the other branches of government. She notes how “[t]he
administration of (Republican) President Theodore Roosevelt provides a
70. Id. at 130.
71. Julie Novkov, The Dangerous Fantasy of Lincoln: Framing Executive Power as
Presidential Mastery, 73 MD. L. REV. 54 (2013).
72. Id. at 70.
73. Id. at 67–68.
74. Id. at 70, 74–75.
75. See Symposium, The Thirteenth Amendment: Meaning, Enforcement, and Contemporary
Implications, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (2012); Symposium, The Maryland Constitutional Law
Schmooze, 71 MD. L. REV. 12 (2011).
76. Novkov, supra note 71, at 82.
77. Leslie F. Goldstein, How Equal Protection Did and Did Not Come to the United States,
and the Executive Branch Role Therein, 73 MD. L. REV. 190 (2013).
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limited exception to the otherwise dismal picture for African American civil
rights that prevailed between 1885 and 1910.” 78 In a time period when
Congress repealed civil rights laws 79 and the Supreme Court sustained
racial segregation80 while refusing to intervene when minorities were
fraudulently disenfranchised, 81 Roosevelt “prosecute[d] Klan-type mobs”
and other persons who violently sought to subordinate racial minorities. 82
Goldstein admits that her data is limited and bound to a particular period.
Nevertheless, her study provides some reason for thinking that the
President, at times, may have the right balance of relative electoral
insulation and national responsibility necessary to lead some crusades for
justice while preserving the gains of previous crusades. Presidential
protection of rights, Goldstein suggests, reflects “the presidency [having] a
constituency significantly different from that of the House of
Representatives,” and “an international diplomatic constituency” that
“played a role in moderating . . . Congress’s inclination . . . to deal harshly
with the Chinese people.” 83 At least in some special instances, Goldstein
concludes, the “institutional features” of the presidency “mitigate[d] the
harshness of majority tyranny.” 84
Ronald Kahn provides a more abstract connection between executive
power and individual rights. 85 His analysis breaks down the conventional
distinction between the polity principles typically taught in the first
semester of constitutional law and the rights principles typically taught in
the second semester of constitutional law. As both Kahn and Justice
Kennedy recognize, Americans adopted particular structures of government
in large part because they thought particular governing arrangements were
more likely than enumerated rights to protect fundamental freedoms. In a
concurring opinion declaring the line-item veto unconstitutional, Kennedy
wrote, “[l]iberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek
to transgress the separation of powers.” 86 Kahn similarly states, “debates
over polity principles informing the powers of government institutions raise

78. Id. at 194.
79. See XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN
REPUBLICANS, 1860–1910, at 254–59 (1997).
80. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
81. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
82. Goldstein, supra note 77, at 194–95.
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id. at 214.
85. Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and Executive Power: Exploring Nascent
Individual Rights in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 73 MD. L. REV. 133
(2013).
86. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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important questions about individual rights.” 87 This fusion of polity and
rights principles was particularly evident when the Supreme Court decided
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 88 Justice Scalia’s
opinion in that case concluded, “the fragmentation of power produced by
the structure of our Government is central to liberty.” 89 Kahn and Justice
Ginsburg disagree, but only because they see the Affordable Care Act not
simply as within federal power, but as liberty enhancing. Ginsburg points
out, “[v]irtually everyone . . . consumes health care at some point in his or
her life. . . . Health insurance is a means of paying for this care, nothing
more.” 90 Kahn emphasizes that executive and legislative powers are more
to be feared in some instances than others. He maintains, “eliminating
privacy rights would allow government to abuse individuals and minority
groups in ways that giving government permission to impact their economic
decisions would not.” 91
Executive power is likely to remain at the core of American
constitutionalism for the foreseeable future. The National Surveillance
State seems relatively enduring as President Obama modifies only at the
margins Bush Administration policies and prefers not to implement more
conservative rather than more liberal laws. 92 Politics has been surprisingly
stable since 1994. Democrats have won the popular vote in five of the last
six Presidential elections. Republicans have enjoyed a good margin in the
House of Representatives for eight of the last ten Congresses. The recent
government shutdown highlights how polarization among elites remains
vibrant. Under these conditions, executives are likely to push for increased
powers, while facing increased pushback from Congress and, perhaps, the
courts.
The articles in this symposium may nevertheless reflect a subtle turn in
American thinking about the separation of powers. The first wave of
separation of powers thinking took place at a time when Republicans were
thought to have a lock on the Electoral College and Democrats relatively
permanent control of the House of Representatives. 93 In this political
environment, prominent conservatives developed the notion of a unitary
executive, whose control over the executive branch could not be interfered
87. Kahn, supra note 85, at 135.
88. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
89. Id. at 2677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Kahn, supra note 85, at 189.
92. See Lain, supra note 49, at 235–43 (noting that the Obama Administration has not been
willing to implement or fully defend certain federal bans on marijuana, mandates to deport certain
immigrants, and the Defense of Marriage Act).
93. See Steven Taylor, Whatever Happened to the Republican “Lock” on the Electoral
College, 7 NEW ENG. J. POL. SCI. 25, 26 (2013).
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with by Congress. 94 John Yoo, the architect of bold presidential war
powers claims, 95 was a member of the second Bush Administration. This
symposium may reflect a second wave of separation of powers thinking at a
time when Democrats seem to have a greater lock on the Electoral College
and Republicans more enduring control of the House of Representatives. 96
Some liberals, most notably Novkov and Fletcher, retain the previous
generation’s skepticism about the merits of executive power. Others, most
notably Tipler and Chambers are more enthusiastic. Their articles suggest
the possibility of a new constitutional order in which liberals seek to expand
the constitutional authority of Democrats in the White House, while more
conservative scholars emphasize the virtues of a Congress controlled by
Republicans. After all, the articles in this volume and public discourse in
2013 might have been quite different if the focus of debate over presidential
domestic power was the refusal of a Republican president to implement the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 97 and an executive order
interpreting the “arch of congressional legislation” as justifying a national
ban on same-sex marriage.

94. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
95. See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
96. See Taylor, supra note 93, at 55–56; Harold D. Meyerson, Why the House Didn’t Flip,
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 7, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/why-housedidn%E2%80%99t-flip.
97. 18 U.S.C. 248 (1994).

